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(詳細はCommunist forces: Viet Cong Pathet Lao |combatant2a= |commander1= Bùi Đình Đạm Huỳnh Văn Cao John Paul Vann Đỗ Cao Trí Roger H. C. Donlon George Stephen Morrison Nguyen Co Franklin P. Eller Nguyễn Chánh Thi Cao Văn Viên Charles Q. Williams Lewis W. Walt John Healy Thomas W. Brown Harold G. Moore Basil L. Plumley Robert McDade Lowell E. English Byung Soo Choi Ngô Quang Trưởng Harry Smith Guy S. Meloy Kyung-Jin Chung Colin Townsend Emil Radics Herman Nickerson James A. Graham Albert C. Slater, Jr. Sterling K. Coates Chae Myung Shin Don Robertson Lawrence D. Peters Vincent Robert Capodanno William Calley Terry de la Mesa Allen, Jr. William R. Peers David E. Lownds William C. Westmoreland Soulang Phetsampou Nguyễn Văn Thiệu Ngô Quang Trưởng Foster LaHue Frank C. Willoughby Clarence F. Blanton Richard Secord Ferdinand Marcos Fabian Ver Vang Pao Donald Dunstan Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. Julian Ewell |commander2= Hoàng Văn Thái Hai Hoang Nguyễn Hoài Pho Nguyen Don Giáp Văn Cương Tran Dinh Xu Chu Huy Man Lê Trọng Tấn Nguyễn Hữu An Nguyen Van Nguyen Thanh Hong Vo Minh Triet Hoang Minh Thao Tran The Mon Tran Quy Hai Võ Nguyên Giáp Le Cong Phe Trần Văn Quang Truong Muc Anatoliy Hiuppinen |strength1=United States: 409,111 (1969) ARVN: ~600,000 (1969) |strength2=NVA/VC: 420,000 (1969) |casualties1=South Vietnam: 74,416 KIA United States 47,691 KIA〔(Statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War ) The National Archives.〕 |casualties2=NVA/VC: 430,000+ (1967–1968) |notes= }} In the Vietnam War, after the assassinations of Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy in late 1963 and the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and the continuing political instability in the South, the United States made a policy commitment to begin joint warfare in South Vietnam, a period of gradual escalation and Americanization, involving the commitment of large-scale combat forces from the United States and allied countries. It was no longer assumed the Republic of Vietnam could create a desirable situation without major external assistance.〔, pp. 10-18〕 This phase of the war lasted until the election of Richard Nixon, and the change of U.S. policy to Vietnamization, or giving the main combat role back to the South Vietnamese military. The North Vietnamese term for the large-scale introduction of U.S. ground forces, in 1965, is the ''Local War'', according to Gen. Trần Văn Trà, the (Vietnamese ) " Party concluded, the "United States was forced to introduce its own troops because it was losing the war. It had lost the political game in Vietnam....the situation allows us to shift our revolution to a new stage, that of decisive victory." The Party issued a resolution to this effect, which was transmitted, in October 1967, to the Central Office for South Vietnam and to key officials of the major commands in the South. They were directed to begin detailed planning for what was to become the Tet Offensive.〔, pp. 38-40〕 Note that there was a delay of approximately two years between the Politburo decision and the directive to begin planning, so it can be asked if the Politburo did actually make the broad strategic decision in 1965, or some time later, as they grew more aware of the effect of U.S. operations. Robert McNamara suggests that the overthrow of Dương Văn Minh by Nguyễn Khánh, in January 1964, reflected different U.S. and Vietnamese priorities. "And since we still did not recognize the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and North Vietnamese as nationalist in nature, we never realized that encouraging public identification between Khanh and America may have only reinforced in the minds of many Vietnamese that his government drew its support not from the people, but from the United States."〔, p. 112〕 ==Frustrations and assassination of Diem== (詳細はARVN unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy Administration promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Some policy-makers in Washington began to believe that Diem was incapable of defeating the communists, and some even feared that he might make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. Discussions then began in Washington regarding the need to force a regime change in Saigon. This was accomplished on November 2, 1963, when the CIA allegedely aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow Diem. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–69」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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